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A NEw CRITERION OF CONTRACT.
BY R. C. McMuRTRIE, ESQ.
AN answer to an inquiry for rate of transportation makes a contract
complete on delivery of the goods to the carrier, so that the actual con-
tract then made by the acceptance of the bill of lading is a nullity,
and the contract remains as if the carrier had accepted the goods in
silence.
This is the decision of the highest Court of the greatest commercial
State of the Union. Jennings v. Grand Trunk R. R., New York Court of
Appeals, 30 Am. Law Reg., 638.
The necessary corollary, nay, the direct decision is, that the exclu-
sion of perils, of the sea, or fire, or acts of the public enemy, is impossible,'
if rates have previously been given in reply to an inquiry. Apply this to
policies of insurance-life or fire-to sales of merchandise, to contracts
for hire !
Plainly, if such a piece of folly requires analysis for exposure it lies
here: There was no contract until acceptance by the carrier. No one is
bound to sell because he has named a price at which he sells. The con-
tract made when the goods were delivered would have included the
inference of a contract on the proposed terms, had not such an inference
been excluded by annexing the substituted contract; and if it was not
intended that the substituted contract should have such an operation, it
was the duty of the shipper to demand acceptance on the naked promise
to carry for a certain rate. If the New York rule were the correct canon
for construing conduct and words, it undoubtedly follows that there was no
right to a bill of lading or a receipt, or any acknowledgment. If that
document was a right, it was because the intention to act on the usual
terms of shippers and carriers was implied in the making of the rate. In
truth, there was no contract at all, but for a rate-and that conditioned
upon the delivery and acceptance of the goods. To force a carrier into a
contract to carry when there was no correlative obligation to ship, i
s
inconsistent with accuracy. Common sense, it may be said, implies such
an obligation ; but, if implied at all, surely it must be upon the customary
terms of bills of lading and other similar documents.
If A asks B the rate for cotton or sugar, will anyone contend that by
naming a rate, B is bound to sell whatever A demands-it may be ten
times what he has got? A man cannot but be amazed that anything so
elementary has been overlooked as what does constitute a contract.
